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Abstract: In 2008 EUROCONTROL published Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) Security Guidance to Air Navigation 
Service Providers (ANSPs), to assist them in complying with regulatory 
security requirements. This included a visualisation tool which allowed the 
consistency of control sets to be reviewed and communicated: consistency 
being the degree to which more sophisticated controls were supported by core 
controls. The validation of that guidance included surveys which were 
conducted to contrast current practice in European ANSPs with a baseline 
control set based on ISO/IEC 27001:2005. The consistency test revealed 
significant gaps in the control strategies of these organisations: despite 
relatively sophisticated control regimes there were areas which lacked core 
controls. Key missing elements identified in the ANSPs surveyed include 
security management and senior management engagement, system 
accreditation, the validation and authentication of data used by ATM systems, 
incident management, and business continuity preparedness. Since anonymity 
requires that little can be said about the original surveys these results are 
necessarily indicative, so the paper contrasts these findings with 
contemporaneous literature, including audit reports on security in US ATM 
systems. The two sources prove to be in close agreement, confirming the value 
of the control consistency view in providing an overview of an organisation's 
security control regime. 
This paper is a revised and expanded version of the paper entitled "Security 
Blind Spots in the ATM Safety Culture" presented at the SecATM workshop at 
ARES 2013, Regensburg, Germany. September 2-6th 2013. This paper 
introduces the consistency perspective and its methodological use, the previous 
paper was limited to results as they applied to ATM.  
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Service 
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1. Introduction 
In order to assist Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) in Europe with the 
implementation of EC Regulation 2096/2005(2005a), EUROCONTROL developed a 
range of security guidance material which included Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) Security Guidance published in 2008. 
The guidance material was designed to assist ANSPs with the selection of baseline 
controls to meet the requirements of ISO/IEC 27001:2005 (International Organisation for 
Standards (ISO), 2005), and includes a questionnaire which can be used to assess an 
organization's current level of compliance. The questionnaire was tested by a small (less 
than 10) sample of ATM organizations in Europe, chosen to represent a range of different 
size organizations and degree of security maturity. The responses were a mixture of 
comments on the proposed questions and completed questionnaires. 
The ICT guidance presented controls in 6 incremental levels, allowing a control 
baseline (a specific level) to be set using a coarse risk assessment for a specific 
organization. A modified form of 'spider' presentation was developed as a management 
tool to allow the examination of control maturity and, importantly, visualize if the pattern 
of controls is accumulative (more complex controls built on the basis of core controls) or 
if it is inconsistent, meaning that some sophisticated controls are present but more basic 
controls are missing. Reviewing the survey findings in this way demonstrates a high 
degree of inconsistency in the control sets.  
This paper respects the anonymity of the survey responders, and is therefore limited 
in the details that can be provided. However, the structure of the guidance material and 
the results taken as a whole provide important lessons for the assessment of control 
systems and specific conclusions relating to deficiencies in Air Navigation Service 
Providers' security management.  
These putative findings are tested by reviewing other literature sources that identify 
security defects in Air Traffic Management, including contemporaneous audit reports on 
US organizations. The results closely parallel the findings derived from the European 
survey data.  
The contribution of this work is that it introduces the concept of consistency in 
control regimes, and provides a mechanism that allows it to be readily assessed and 
visualized. The value of this concept is demonstrated by quantifying key problems in 
security in existing ATM organizations, based on actual survey and audit information. 
ATM organizations have a long-established safety culture supported by 
organizational practices and standards. There is certainly an overlap between controls 
used in support of safety and those needed to mitigate security threats; however, this 
work demonstrates that organizations with a strong safety focus may have serious 
deficiencies in their ability to defend and respond to security incidents.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to the ICT 
Guidance; in particular it explains how baseline controls were structured and the purpose 
of the questionnaire. Section 3 introduces Control Consistency and the diagrams used to 
visualize and review consistency. Section 4 describes the method used to process survey 
results, the validation of those results and their review using a control consistency spider.  
Section 5 reviews ISO/IEC 27001 controls that were found to be absent in the corpus, and 
Section 6 describes contemporaneous evidence from alternative sources that suggest 
security problems in ATM systems: audit reports on US ATM organizations and known 
ATM ICT security vulnerabilities. The discussion in section 7 contrasts the two sets of 
results and also identifies current security standards in which this technique could be 
employed. The paper is concluded in section 8. 
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2. ICT Guidance 
The brief for the ICT Guidance was to provide assistance for ANSPs who wished to 
establish appropriate baseline security controls in compliance with established 
international standards. The primary source was ISO/IEC 27001:2005, which is also the 
focus of this paper; other standards (COBIT and ISO 13335-4) were also referenced. 
The controls specified in ISO/IEC 27001 are necessarily generic requirements that 
apply to a wide range of different circumstances.  Even supplemented by the guidance in 
ISO/IEC 27002 they are difficult to interpret for those new to security management. One 
problem is the selection of appropriate concrete controls; another is ensuring that the type 
of each control is proportionate to the risk.  
The approach taken in the guidance was first to define six levels which correspond to 
coarse graduations of risk.  Controls in the guidance were then arranged to allow a 
baseline set of controls to be selected appropriate to the level of risk to which the 
organization is exposed. The choice of which risk level applied to an organization used a 
high-level risk assessment process which is not described in detail here; however, the 
next section summarizes the criteria used in the assessment in order to clarify how risk 
levels were motivated and structured.  
2.1. ICT Risk Levels 
Information security is often a balance between protecting the whole organization, 
and dealing with risks to specific Service or Business Critical (SBC) assets. This balance 
is influenced by the degree to which critical assets are isolated from the rest of the 
organization; relatively isolated systems maintain a focus on managing SBC-specific 
risks, whereas if SBC assets are fully integrated the need is to focus more on overall 
protection.  
This split was recognized in the choice of the 6 risk levels, with the principal 
difference between levels 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6 being the scope of many of the 
controls. At the odd numbered levels, the most stringent controls are confined to those 
parts of the ANSP that support SBC functions, whereas at the even numbered levels most 
of the controls apply throughout the organization. Odd numbered levels are appropriate 
where sensitive functions are isolated from the rest of the organization and it is possible 
to protect them separately.  
The second differentiator between levels is the nature of the threat from potential 
adversaries. The basic level (1, 2) is concerned with low-capability threats, such as those 
from hackers and criminals with limited expertise and resources. The risks arising from 
these threats can be mitigated by procedural and management controls and readily 
available technical products. As the threat agents become more capable, and their targets 
more attractive, the strength of the controls needs to be increased. Levels 3 and 4 
anticipate the need to protect more valuable assets (strictly speaking, more severe 
impacts) against threats from more sophisticated and better-resourced adversaries, such 
as those engaged in serious or organized crime, including certain terrorist organizations. 
The highest levels (5 and 6) are concerned with risks arising from the most capable 
adversaries, with the resource and expertise normally associated with a nation state. 
On this scale we anticipate that many ANSPs, including national Air Traffic 
Management services, require a level 3 baseline, corresponding to systems whose 
compromise could result in serious impacts, but where the critical assets are well isolated. 
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2.2. Example of Assignment of Controls to Risk Levels  
Consider ISO/IEC 27001 A8.1.2 as an example of how risk levels are used to suggest 
baseline controls. The ISO control requirement is: 
“Background verification checks on all candidates for employment, contractors, 
and third party users shall be carried out in accordance with relevant laws, 
regulations and ethics, and proportional to the business requirements, the 
classification of the information to be accessed, and the perceived risks.” 
 
The ICT Guidelines specify three levels of rigor in background checking: taking up 
normal employment references, basic verification checks, and extensive background 
checks. The last two will usually be specified by national security authorities; for 
example a basic verification may be a check on criminal records, and an extensive check 
may be a full background investigation. 
The resulting guidance for this control is summarized in Table 1, in which these 
requirements are placed on SBC-specific staff for isolated systems, or all staff where 
SBC systems are not isolated. 
In practice not all controls are amenable to this treatment; however, this example 
provides an illustration of the general approach used to specify ranked controls. 
Table 1 Control Guidance in Proportion to Risk 
Risk Level Summary of guidance for ISO 27001 A8.1.2 
1 Employment References, SBC staff 
2 Employment References, all staff 
3 Basic verification Checks, SBC staff 
4 Basic verification Checks, all staff 
5 Extensive background verification, SBC staff 
6 Extensive background verification, all staff 
3. Control Consistency 
3.1. Definition of Consistency 
As a mathematical construct the idea of consistency is concerned with avoiding 
contradictions between formulae. (For a seminal account see (Church, 1996) section 17). 
This strict logical consistency is sometimes used to ensure that security policies, such as 
firewall or access control rules, do not contain contradictions that may suggest a mistaken 
configuration or lead to unpredictable results. The notion of consistency used here is less 
formal, being concerned with detecting omissions rather than contradictions, and more in 
keeping with the informal English definition:   
Agreement or harmony of parts or features to one another. (Merriam-Webster) 
 
This idea is important in security because of the holistic nature of the problem. A 
security auditor tasked with reviewing the quality of a web application will certainly be 
concerned with access control, but will also care about other factors such as software 
quality, change control, service continuity, audit facilities, the management of physical 
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access, human factors and compliance to regulatory standards. A significant omission in 
any of the control areas identified in standards such as ISO/IEC 27002 is likely to provide 
an easy route into the system regardless of the quality of other controls. 
We therefore model the fundamental idea that the security of a system is a function of 
its weakest component, and that the components belong to diverse categories that are not 
directly comparable.  
Specifically we define: 
x A control Category to be one of a number of classes of controls (e.g. the 
'clauses' in ISO/IEC 27002). 
x A control Level to be a group of controls within a Category. 
x Levels are ordered within a category but are not necessarily directly 
comparable with levels in other categories.. 
x A control Baseline to be a set of Levels, one from each category. 
 
Using these terms our definition of consistency is that:  
A control regime is consistent if within every category all controls at the 
baseline level are present and that there are no missing controls at levels below 
the baseline.  
 
This paper is concerned with detecting and highlighting consistency problems in 
control regimes and providing an accessible gap analysis, rather than attempting to 
provide numerical metrics. However, it should be evident that if controls are ordered in 
levels, then omissions at the lowest levels are potentially the most serious.   
There are several current examples of security control systems in which the controls 
are ordered in levels, these will be discussed further in section 7.2, below. 
3.2. Visualisation 
Spider diagrams are effective in showing the 'high water mark' of various categories 
of control (e.g. management v operational, v physical) and identifying categories which 
are generally under or over controlled by comparing the number or percentage of 
implemented controls in each category. However, we argue that in their usual form they 
are unable to capture the important concern identified above: missing low-level 
components. 
To meet this need a diagram was developed which showed control coverage in a 
spider-form, but where the area inside the spider was coloured to show the percentage of 
controls actually implemented. This provided the same effective visual summary as a 
normal spider, with the added benefit of showing consistency of control coverage within 
the overall boundary.  
The resulting consistency spider diagram, which also illustrates the expected result 
for ATM organisations, is shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Expected Consistency Spider 
aaaaa
aaaaa
aaaaa
>90%
>60%
>30%
<30%
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaa
Compliance Corporate Policy
OrganisationAudit
Acquisition Human
Technical
ICT Operation
Physical
 
 
Note that categories used in this diagram are similar, but not exactly identical to those 
in ISO 27001, because the ICT Guidance was required to consolidate requirements from 
several security standards.   
Organisations with an overall risk level of 3 (as expected for Air Traffic Management 
Services) would be expected to implement all the core controls at this level, although it 
would be reasonable to expect that in some areas the control treatment would not be 
complete - not all controls would be applicable to every organisation. For the sake of 
illustration the figure shows a lower proportion of controls implemented at level 3 for 
Audit, Compliance and Organisation. This type of incompleteness would merit review. It 
would also be normal to expect some additional controls; for illustration Figure 1 shows 
extra controls implemented in the physical and acquisition categories. Controls of this 
sort may be motivated by security risk analysis, or by other concerns, such as safety. In 
the case of Air Traffic Management physical controls are often a significant safety 
consideration and so advanced controls, such as the physical protection of 
communications cables, may be present for this reason. 
 This type of presentation provides a more informative summary of the control regime 
than a standard spider, which would show only the outer boundary, or the overall 
proportion, of controls implemented. 
4. Results 
In addition to the ICT guidance which specified control levels a self-assessment 
questionnaire was developed which allowed organisations to measure their current 
control profile. The questionnaire and the results of the survey carried out to validate the 
guidance are described below. 
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4.1. Questionnaire 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to allow ANSPs to self-assess their compliance 
with the ICT Guidance, allowing an organization to develop a two-dimensional model 
which indicated the degree (in risk level terms) to which ISO/IEC 27001 controls are 
applied. 
The ICT Guidance and Questionnaire was peer-reviewed by experts at 
EUROCONTROL and within the broader ATM Security Team. Of more relevance here 
is the process used in the development of the questionnaire.    
The questionnaire was provided to a small volunteer sample of ANSPs in Europe, 
chosen to represent a range of different size organizations and degree of security 
maturity. They were asked to attempt to complete the questionnaire; some did so while 
others provided comments on the questions. Invariably some questions were difficult to 
interpret and needed to be updated; overall the exercise produced valuable feedback. 
4.2. Validation of Risk-Level Approach 
Using the survey results it was also possible to numerically test the assessment that a 
typical ANSP would correspond to a risk level of 3 by measuring the proportion of 
reported controls at each risk level. The results are presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Proportion of Controls Reported at each Risk Level 
Control
Level
6
5
4
3
2
1
11%
12%
21%
53%
49%
68%
 
 
The overall pattern of reported controls in Figure 2 supports this assessment, with a 
strong proportion of controls appropriate to risk levels 3 and below: systems where the 
impact of a security incident may be significant, but which are relatively isolated within 
their organizations.  
The reader should bear in mind that baseline controls are supplemented by specific 
controls derived from an analysis of the actual risks in the environment. As noted above, 
the presence of a proportion of higher-level controls should therefore be expected.  In 
practice many of these derive from established safety concerns and practices, such as the 
protection of physical sites and infrastructure. 
Plotting these results using the consistency spider resulted in a much more revealing 
analysis, as shown in Figure 3  
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Figure 3. Consistency Spider for Combined Survey Results 
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4.3. Consistency results 
The consistency spider in Figure 3 is the sum of all the survey responses, essentially an 
average control disposition for the Air Navigation Service Providers surveyed. It 
highlights a wide range of issues associated with the controls actually deployed.  
The presence of controls above the level three baseline is expected in organisations 
where such controls are justified by safety issues, or where additional controls have been 
selected in response to a risk analysis.  
However, Figure 3 suggests that the controls deployed at risk level 3 and below are 
extremely inconsistent: there are major gaps in the control regime, and these gaps appear 
in many of the control categories. There are significant gaps in Organisation, Corporate 
Policy, Human control and ICT Operation categories, and to a lesser degree in other 
areas. 
The anonymous basis of this survey prevents an organisation-by-organisation 
analysis, but the joint consistency spider shown above provides a strong indication of the 
power of this approach to identify inconsistencies in control regimes. 
The next section will provide more information about exactly what this consistency 
test suggests in terms of missing controls, while remaining within the bounds of 
anonymity. 
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5. Control Review 
The questionnaires were completed with no agreement or intention of publication, so 
the results presented in this paper are limited to identifying common trends in order avoid 
identifying respondents, or providing statistics from which any respondents may be 
identified.  
Trends are quantified by identifying controls that are missing from all the 
questionnaire responses. We recognize that this is not as sensitive a test as a more 
detailed analysis of individual responses; however, the very sparse entries in some of the 
core control areas in the consistency spider suggests that this approach may be 
productive. In more detail:   
The responses were merged, and controls which were omitted from all of the inputs 
were identified; these were further filtered to include only controls identified as 
requirements for risk levels 1-3 in the ICT Guidance. Finally any controls where a 
respondent queried the interpretation or specificity of a question were removed.  
The resulting controls are those appropriate to a wide range of ANSPs (control levels 
1-3) but which were missing from the survey responses.  
We acknowledge that even if a respondent failed to identify a control it does not 
necessarily mean that the control was not present; the question may not have been 
correctly interpreted, or that aspect of the organization may have been outside the 
knowledge of the individual concerned. This is a further motivation for anonymity; 
however, identifying controls omitted from all the responses should provide valid 
candidates for systematic omissions, even if there are occasional errors in the responses. 
The results listed in the next section are mapped to associated ISO/IEC 27001:2005 
control requirements. The questionnaire used numbered questions which were traceable 
to paragraphs in the ICT Guidance which were in turn cross-referenced to controls in the 
standard. 
5.1. Results 
Controls absent in all the questionnaire responses are presented in three tables below: 
x Table 2  Consistently Missing Management and Organization Controls 
x Table 3  Consistently Missing Technical Controls 
x Table 4  Consistently Missing Incident Management and Business 
Continuity Controls 
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Table 2 Consistently Missing Management and Organization Controls 
ISO 27001 Annex A/ISO 27002 Control Requirement Finding 
5.1.1  An information security policy document should 
be approved by management, and published and 
communicated to all employees and relevant 
external parties. 
Policy was not communicated 
consistently to employees and others.  
In some organisations a policy was 
'available', for example on a security 
website. 
5.1.2 The information security policy should be 
reviewed at planned intervals or if significant 
changes occur to ensure its continuing 
suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness. 
No planned policy reviews were 
identified. 
6.1.1 Management should actively support security 
within the organization through clear direction, 
demonstrated commitment, explicit assignment, 
and acknowledgment of information security 
responsibilities. 
No director-level manager was 
identified with explicit responsibility 
for security. 
6.1.8 The organization’s approach to managing 
information security and its implementation (i.e. 
control objectives, controls, policies, processes, 
and procedures for information security) should 
be reviewed independently at planned intervals, 
or when significant changes to the security 
implementation occur. 
No external/independent reviews 
were identified. 
 
6.2.1 The risks to the organization’s information and 
information processing facilities from business 
processes involving external parties should be 
identified and appropriate controls implemented 
before granting access. 
No process for assessing the risk of 
connection to external parties was 
identified.  
 
The meaning of 'independent' in control 6.1.8 (Table 2) was interpreted as broadly as 
possible to include any form of fully independent review of the security management 
system.  In particular, it was not judged on the basis of ISO/IEC 27001 certification. 
There is a potential difficulty in judging independence if no director-level manager is 
assigned security responsibility, but in the event this problem did not arise. 
In Table 2, answers to 6.2.1 were generally blank.  Other controls associated with the 
commissioning of systems or software elicited a range of answers. It is clear that there are 
well-established processes for testing and commissioning safety-related systems, and 
some security testing is also conducted.  However, there is no evidence of a security 
accreditation processes: specific decision gates based on the security risk of deployment, 
enhancement or connection. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
Control Consistency as a Management Tool: The Identification of Systematic Security 
Control Weaknesses in Air Traffic Management. 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
Table 3 Consistently Missing Technical Controls 
ISO 27001 Annex A/ISO 27002 Control Requirement Finding 
12.2.1 Data input to applications should be validated to 
ensure that this data is correct and appropriate. 
These three controls were presented 
as separate questions, and no 
evidence was found for systematic 
validation of input/output data or 
processing. 
Virus checking and source 
authentication of software were 
quoted as controls that may 
mitigate malicious corruption of 
software.  
12.2.2 Validation checks should be incorporated into 
applications to detect any corruption of 
information through processing errors or 
deliberate acts. 
12.2.4 Data output from an application should be 
validated to ensure that the processing of stored 
information is correct and appropriate to the 
circumstances. 
12.3.1 A policy on the use of cryptographic controls for 
protection of information should be developed and 
implemented. 
No policies were identified, nor key 
management to support technical 
controls.  
 12.3.2 Key management should be in place to support the 
organization’s use of cryptographic techniques. 
 
In Table 3, it may be a surprise that a cryptographic policy is included at risk level 3. 
Note that this does not imply that there is any confidential information in a system; for 
example, key management is necessary to support the authentication of servers to 
validate data transfer. 
Table 4  Consistently Missing Incident Management and Business Continuity Controls 
ISO 27001 Annex A/ISO 27002 Control Requirement Finding 
13.2.1 Management responsibilities and procedures should 
be established to ensure a quick, effective, and 
orderly response to information security incidents. 
No evidence was offered for an 
organised approach to information 
security incidents. 
14.1.1 A managed process should be developed and 
maintained for business continuity throughout the 
organization that addresses the information security 
requirements needed for the organization’s business 
continuity. 
No 'explicit and practiced' 
processes were identified for 
business continuity 
 
Table 4 reflects the responses accurately; however, some clarification may be 
helpful. Most ATM organizations have response processes and reserve capacity for some 
types of incident; for example, loss of mains power, or some types of communication or 
equipment failure.  There are also security-related processes, such as the detection and 
resolution of the misuse of IT by employees. The missing elements highlighted here are a 
planned response to information security incidents (13.2.1), or major continuity events 
such as the loss of a whole centre or major sub-system (14.1.1). 
6. Literature Evidence 
The survey results suggest weaknesses in several areas of management, in data 
validation and in incident response. This section reviews other sources to determine if 
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these indicators are supported by external evidence. The most comprehensive primary 
sources available are US Audit reports which are contemporaneous with the surveys 
described above, a summary of their evidence is followed by a brief review of known 
ATM system vulnerabilities. 
6.1. US Audit Reports 
The US Department of Transportation carries out independent audits on transport 
services, including Air Traffic Management. A series of reports reviewing major failings 
in ATM security were published contemporaneously with the survey described above; 
these failings are summarized in a progress review (2009a); they were: 
“(1) the status of [business continuity] implementation and 
  (2) the enhanced methodology used in the certification and accreditation of air 
traffic control systems security at operational sites.” 
 
The business continuity issue concerned planned contingencies in the event of the 
failure of a major en-route centre. The reference reports unresolved problems including 
technical, communications, staffing and funding aspects; the most significant issue, 
however, is the lack of impact analysis. The capability plan is estimated to achieve: 
“restoration of 80 percent of any affected en route center's capabilities within 3 weeks ...” 
The report notes that the impact on the national service of a three week outage of a major 
center is unexplored. 
 A formal accreditation process had been introduced in response to previous audits; 
however, configuration management of the systems was not sufficient to ensure that 
accredited systems were deployed in the same configuration as that which had been 
tested, nor prevent subsequent unauthorized changes. An actual attack is quoted which 
exploited an unauthorized system configuration to prevent the transfer of flight data in 
FAA Alaska Region, “forcing FAA to manually provide flight information to pilots 
flying in that region.”  
A major focus of this report is the inadequacy of independent site reviews, which 
should have detected configuration problems.  
The precursor to this report was a general overview of the US Department of 
Transport security program (2007) which identified the two failings described above. A 
number of detailed issues were identified, which may be transient (e.g. aviation systems 
not correctly classified as high-impact), together with a major deficiency in incident 
reporting: 
“During FY 2007, FAA did not report 40 cyber security incidents ... Most of 
these incidents involved viruses in FAA computers.  
... During FY 2006, FAA had to shut down a portion of air traffic control 
systems because of security events. While FAA did a commendable job in 
cleaning up the infected computers and enhancing the underlying configuration 
management controls, it nonetheless reported .... that ‘no successful cyber 
events that significantly disabled or degraded our service’ had taken place.” 
 
An earlier report by the US Government Accountability Office (2005b) identifies a 
wide range of security problems, and ascribes the core problem to security management: 
“A key reason for the information security weaknesses that we identified in 
FAA’s air traffic control systems was that the agency had not yet fully 
implemented an information security program ...” 
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Finally, a report on FAA web security (2009b) highlights the vulnerability of ATM 
systems to attacks on webservers, including documenting actual attacks. It concludes that 
the core deficiency is the need for intrusion detection and incident response. 
In summary, these audit reports highlight serious failures in: 
x Security Management. 
x Business Continuity. 
x Incident Management (detection and reporting). 
x System accreditation and subsequent configuration control. 
 
Current audits (e.g. (2011a)) focus on a wide range of specific controls. They report 
progress against some of the previously identified problems, but continue to highlight the 
difficulty of achieving a fully effective security management system within ATM. 
6.2. ATM System Vulnerabilities 
The audit reports referenced above describe virus infections that disabled ATM 
services, and other events where intrusive hacking resulted in the deep access to ATM 
infrastructure by malicious hackers. Penetration testing also demonstrated the 
vulnerability of ATM systems to targeted attacks (2009b) and challenges the assumption 
that ATM operational systems are effectively isolated within their organizations and from 
Internet-facing servers.  
The vulnerability of radio signals, including GPS, to jamming is well known. 
However, the types of attack that can be achieved as a result of interfering with radio 
signals are poorly understood.  Recent evidence presented in the US (2012) includes an 
account of a GPS spoofing demonstration carried out by the University of Texas at the 
White Sands Missile range. A locally generated spoof GPS signal overpowered genuine 
satellite broadcasts and allowed the manipulation of the flight path of an unmanned 
helicopter, despite the fact that it remained in communication with its flight controller. 
Despite known vulnerabilities and a future dependence on high-accuracy timing and 
position information in civil transport systems, 'limited progress' has been made on 
backup capabilities to mitigate possible disruption (2013a).  
Other ATM protocols are known to be vulnerable to spoofing attacks; for example, 
researchers have demonstrated the ability to inject false surveillance tracks using spoof 
ADS-B transmissions (Costin, and Francillon, 2012). Unlike GPS spoofing this attack 
can be achieved with relatively low-cost and widely accessible components; the authors 
also reference similar results presented within the hacking community. The scope for the 
confusion of pilots or controllers by the injection of false tracks is considerable. 
In all these cases, the underlying defect is a lack of data validation, whether by poor 
system configuration in the case of virus and hacking incidents, or by design oversight in 
the case of ADS-B. Costin and Francillon note: 
“The first and simplest thing ... is to add integrity verification to ADS-B 
messages. If any certified ADS-B device can securely verify validity of other 
aircrafts’ broadcasts ...  message injection is suddenly not possible or at least 
not as easy to accomplish.” 
 
The lack of authentication in aviation data protocols has also been exploited in a 
demonstration attack which subverted the navigation systems of a standard aircraft 
simulator (Teso, 2013).  In this case spoof messages were injected via the Aircraft 
Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS). Even if the same 
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vulnerabilities are not present in operational systems, the method of access - via an 
unauthenticated protocol - has been demonstrated. 
There are two common objections to the need for security controls that are not 
present in an existing system, such as authentication in new protocols: the need to 
demonstrate that malicious attacks will actually occur, and the belief that since the system 
is currently 'secure' then no new controls are needed to ensure its future security. From 
the security perspective both are based on false premises. Real incidents already occur 
where unauthenticated voice traffic is used in an attempt to control aircraft. Recordings of 
real incidents where attackers spoof voice commands leave no doubt about the potential 
danger of confusing the person who is the last line of defence (2011b), or about the 
reality of such spoofing attacks. The deliberate use of GPS jammers, resulting in the 
accidental jamming of nearby GPS avionics systems is also often reported, and has 
resulted in at least one documented judgment against a perpetrator (2013b).  
7. Discussion 
7.1. Contrasting the Consistency approach with Literature Evidence 
 
Summaries of the core security issues suggested by the survey and those identified in 
the literature are contrasted in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 Comparison of Survey and Literature Issues 
Survey Indicators Literature Evidence 
Management 
Senior management responsibility 
Policy review 
Policy communication 
Independent review 
Accreditation process 
Lack of Information security program 
Independent review 
Accreditation process and subsequent 
configuration control. 
Technical 
Systematic validation of data 
Supporting cryptography 
Baseline security configuration 
Data authentication 
Incident 
Incident response 
Business continuity planning 
Incident reporting 
Business continuity planning 
 
It is clear from both sources that deficiencies in essential elements of a security 
management system are present, although the survey controls (responsibility, review, 
communication) are more detailed than the non-specific ‘lack of program’ described in 
published audits. In both cases it is safe to conclude that security management requires 
explicit responsibilities and new processes, and cannot be assumed to exist in a mature 
safety organization. 
The other management security issues align exactly between the two sources: lack of 
independent review, and lack of an accreditation process.  
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In the case of independent review, there is clearly management-level audit in the US 
– evidenced by the audit reports – but not of the controls in individual organizations. The 
most recent reports are concerned with detailed control deficiencies, so it is reasonable to 
assume that more effective control-level review in the US has now been established. 
A similar pattern is evident in the lack of an accreditation process: making an explicit 
security decision about the acceptability of a new system, upgrade or connection. The 
literature records that this process was initially absent, but when introduced it failed to 
defend actual attacks because of a lack of other controls, in this case system configuration 
management.  
Lack of data validation is a common theme in vulnerability analysis; in the examples 
quoted a critical factor is the authentication of the source of data used in ATM. The 
design of protocols without authentication, particularly when they are used over public or 
broadcast networks, is a blatant disregard of the likely safety impact of types of attack 
that are already known to take place.  
Finally, both sources identify business continuity management and incident 
management as issues. The business continuity management problem is a lack of 
resilience and understanding in the face of major events such as loss of a complete centre. 
The sources do not provide enough information to be sure that the incident management 
issues are identical; however, both indicate the absence of a working incident 
management process. 
With reference to Figure 3, it is obvious that this analysis has not identified all of the 
control weaknesses in the organizations surveyed. The combined survey results in Figure 
3 suggest further problems in organization, human factors, and ICT operations. However, 
the approach taken above has identified the common deficiencies, other weaknesses are 
therefore related to individual organizations, and although important, are outside the 
scope of this report.    
In conclusion, there is a clear alignment between the major issues suggested by the 
survey, and those that are found in the literature. The issues summarized in Table 5 
should be regarded as probable core security deficiencies in ATM organizations, until an 
explicit management focus on security is achieved.  
7.2. Applicability to other Control Standards 
While risk assessment is still the primary mechanism for deciding the value of 
controls and evaluating the overall need for security, baseline-oriented systems which 
specify minimum security requirements and rank controls into levels are becoming 
increasingly important. Security standards that embody this approach include FIPS 200  
(FIPS PUB, 2006) which uses a high-level impact assessment to specify a control 
baseline from one of three layers defined in NIST 800-53  (NIST SP, 2007), and a range 
of standards that define organizational maturity in layered terms. 
 The best established maturity approaches are related to software development where 
the levels range from ad-hoc development to predictable process-oriented management. 
A security-related maturity model for software is maintained by the Building in Security 
Maturity Model (McGraw et al., 2010) community. In this model activities are reported 
which support 12 different categories in three maturity layers. 
A recent development is the CyberSecurity Capability Maturity Model based on 
work in the U.S. energy sector (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014). From the perspective 
of this paper it is another example of a system of categories with defined levels in which 
consistency, as defined here, is a required property.  
The trend toward security control systems which are layered with defined baselines 
suggests that the approach described here is directly applicable in a wide range of current 
security applications. 
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8. Conclusions 
This paper has introduced control consistency as a means of reviewing and 
communicating information about the set of controls in a management system. Its use in 
the analysis of a survey of European Air Navigation Service Providers prompted a review 
of common deficiencies in their control regimes. Since confidentiality restricts what can 
be said about the original surveys these results can only be regarded as indicative, so the 
paper contrasts these findings with a review of other evidence from the literature, in 
particular contemporaneous audit reports on security in US ATM systems. The two 
different sources are in close agreement, suggesting that the consistency approach is 
effective in identifying systematic security defects.  
The key issues are listed in Table 5; they include security management and senior 
management engagement, system accreditation, the validation and authentication of data 
used by ATM systems, incident management, and business continuity preparedness. The 
evidence suggests that these may be systematic deficiencies in Air Traffic Management 
security. 
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